rights to the claim that America lacks positive rights, at least at the constitutional level. It is this error that I endeavor to correct. iv The texts of state constitutions force us to questions the ubiquitous assertions that America lacks positive constitutional rights. Illinois was not alone in creating constitutional rights to interventionist and protective government, nor was this provision for miners the only positive right it created.
v Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and across the United States, activists, interest groups, and social movements championed positive rights, and building support for their inclusion in state constitutions.
As a result of these political campaigns, state constitutions have long mandated active government intervention in social and economic life, and have delineated a wide array of situations in which government is not only authorized, but actually obligated to intervene.
State constitutions contain many different kinds of mandates for interventionist and protective government, not only with respect to laborers, but also with respect to government's obligations to care for the poor, aged, and mentally ill, preserve the natural environment, provide free education, and protect debtors' homes and dignity.
This book focuses on three political movements to add these kinds of positive rights to state constitutions. In particular, it examines the campaign for education rights, which spanned the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the movement for positive labor rights, which occurred during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, and the push to add environmental bills of rights to state constitutions during the 1960s and 1970s. Together, these cases serve to highlight not only the historically and geographically contingent variations in the form and function of America's positive rights tradition, but also its extraordinary length. The arguments and political calculations of the three rights movements I examine displayed remarkable continuity across diverse issue areas, vast geographic distances, and entire centuries. It is in this recurrent recourse to constitutional politics, along with the textual provisions in state constitutions, that I identify a sustained positive rights tradition.
State-level organizations' own descriptions of their views and goals provide compelling evidence for the existence of a coherent rights tradition. The leaders of each constitutional movement maintained that government's obligation to protect its people was too important to remain optional, and the protections they sought were too critical to leave at the mercy of legislative discretion. They insisted that the most salient threat to society was not too much government, but too little, and that constitutional law ought not only restrain government, but also force it to provide substantive protections. Many of the organizations that championed positive constitutional rights explained their understanding of the provisions they sought and of their political context through newspapers, newsletters, and internal memos. Their champions also made stirring arguments on behalf of these rights on the floor of states' constitutional conventions and in academic journals. Yet because they exist at the state level, these sustained and oftensuccessful campaigns for positive constitutional rights have been widely overlooked.
This study also sheds new light on the origins of constitutional rights. Most accounts of rights' creation, both within and outside the United States, hold that dominant political coalitions write new rights into constitutions when (and precisely because) they are worried about losing their dominant positions. On this account, movements for new rights are fundamentally conservative projects, intended to maintain the status quo.
However, the origins of the positive rights in state constitutions are quite different. Like the Illinois miners who campaigned for constitutional protections, many positive rights'
advocates did not intend to crystallize existing political arrangements. Instead, these activists hoped to re-write the rules of politics and transform their societies. In the book that follows, I demonstrate that rights movements in the United States have used state constitutions for reasons that theories of constitutional politics have tended to miss. I also argue that constitutional theorists have largely overlooked the positive rights that these movements created.
American Constitutional Exceptionalism
American constitutional law is often said to be exceptional in its lack of rights to governmental protection from social and economic privation. While many other nations' constitutions enshrine positive rights, which obligate the state to intervene in order to protect citizens from non-governmental dangers, American rights are often thought to be negative rights, protecting citizens only from intrusive government by prohibiting governmental intervention. In other words, the U.S. Constitution appears to be dedicated exclusively to limiting scope of government and to keeping government out of the lives of its citizens. Thus, assertions about America's exceptional constitutional rights are still very much the norm.
America's political development was once thought to be similarly unusual. When compared with Europe, the industrializing United States appeared exceptional in its lack protective social and economic regulations and its citizens seemed to evince a strong and unusual aversion to government. Constitutional exceptionalism has thus outlived the dogma from which it was derived.
It is high time that we applied our knowledge of American political development to our assessment of America's constitutional rights. We should ask, in other words, whether American constitutionalism would continue to look exceptional if we broadened our view of governance to include states. I will argue that the answer is a resounding no.
Just as it is mistaken to take the measure of the American state by looking only at the federal government, it is misleading to assess America's rights tradition exclusively with reference to the United States Constitution. insisted that protections against these non-governmental threats were too fundamental to be left in the hands of legislatures. In other words, the movements on behalf of positive rights at the state level sought to weave a social safety net of heartier stuff than mere statutes. Statutory law would certainly compose much of the protection they sought, but they insisted that it must be reinforced by constitutional mandates. 
Second Central Argument: Rights Movements Can Be Aimed at Change
The book's second central argument is that when we look at the movements to create the positive rights in state constitutions, we gain new insights into why people engage in constitutional politics, and why they try to create new constitutional rights.
This argument begins with a well-known puzzle about the origins of constitutional rights.
Rights tell government what it must do and thereby limit government's choices. It seems strange, therefore, that any actors powerful enough to shape a polity's highest law would include binding restraints on their own discretion. Surely, those empowered to write a constitution would prefer to leave their options open and their discretion complete. How, then, can we explain the emergence of constitutions, and especially of constitutional rights?
The most famous solutions to the puzzle of how we get constitutional rights hold that the people powerful enough to shape a constitution's content realize that their political influence may not always loom so large. Therefore, in the interests of preserving their grip on the state well beyond their tenure in office, ruling coalitions enshrine their favorite policies in the form of constitutional rights. Constitutional courts will then be able to enforce these rights and uphold the policies they reflect even against the will of future ruling collations and/or democratic majorities. This story about the origins of rights explains that constitutions are not designed to bind their authors in the present, but are created to bind their authors' counterparts in the future.
To be sure, many American social movements comprised of relative outsiders have mobilized around the claim that their constitutional rights were being violated and that the Constitution demanded a transformed political order. The Civil Rights Movement is one well-known example of this phenomenon, and at least since the Civil Rights Movement, scholars of rights have described the central role of rights consciousness in Americans' efforts to organize for political change, and have registered the symbolic power of rights rhetoric in their struggles for political legitimation and recognition. Studies of constitution writing (as opposed to examinations of evolving constitutional meanings) have described textual rights provisions as products of elite entrenchment projects. This reigning theory about the origins of new textual rights has the three central components: 1) that rights are created by dominant regimes, 2) in an attempt to maintain the status quo, 3) by ushering the judiciary into politics. I argue that, while these factors explain the emergence of constitutional rights under some conditions, none of these elements is necessary for the creation of new constitutional rights.
When we examine the origins of America's positive rights, it quickly becomes apparent that the proponents of new constitutional rights need not hold positions of legislative dominance, are not always seeking to preserve the status quo, nor are they consistently hoping to usher the judiciary into politics. As we will see, the positive rights in state constitutions were often created by different kinds of political actors, and for very different reasons. These movements were not ruling elites or dominant legislative coalitions, but were, in fact, relative outsiders who were frequently frustrated with the legislative process. When they could not get the policy changes they wanted through the legislature, the advocates of positive rights were sometimes able to add the rights they championed to state constitutions. 
The Rest of the Book
Chapter two addresses why state constitutions have been so widely derided and consistently excluded from descriptions of America's constitutional tradition. In particular, it examines the impression that these documents are too detailed to serve as repositories of national political commitments, or even any kind of principled commitment. As a result of their details, state constitutions appear to reflect idiosyncratic anxieties rather than national concerns, to be products of pluralistic competition rather than deliberate judgment, and to enshrine trivial policies rather than fundamental The book's first central argument is that America has positive constitutional rights. In order to make this claim, chapter three provides a definition of rights, and describes the distinction between the categories of positive and negative rights. It then defends the distinction between positive and negative rights against some of its most prominent critics. I argue that, while constitutional theorists have questioned whether it is possible to distinguish positive and negative rights at very high levels of abstraction, the leaders of the rights movements described in this book argued that, at the level of their lived experience, there was a very real difference between rights that protected them only from the state, by forcing the state to restrain itself, and rights that forced the state intervene in order to protect them.
The book's second central argument is that rights movements invest in constitutional change not only because they want constitutions to bind future elites, but also because they want to overcome immediate political obstacles that they cannot not surmount through statutory law alone. In addition, it is not only hegemons or elites who champion rights. Indeed, many of the positive rights in state constitutions were not crafted by ruling coalitions, but were championed by relative outsiders, hoping to change rather than preserve the status quo. In chapter four, I detail the variety of political calculations that drove activists, organizations, and social movements to pursue the creation of positive constitutional rights. I also demonstrate that the motives of these rights advocates are quite different from those described by existing theories about who writes new rights and why they do it.
The next three chapters are case studies of particular positive-rights movements.
Each case study provides evidence for both of the book's central arguments. Chapter five, a study of constitutional education rights, focuses on the common school movement, which originated in the Jacksonian period and continued through the Reconstruction era.
The common school movement successfully established the states' constitutional duty to provide education, and its leaders argued that government had a moral duty to expand opportunities for children whose parents could not otherwise afford to educate them, and insisting that state legislatures should be legally obligated to fulfill it. This movement was quite clear that the value of constitutional rights lay in their potential to promote policy changes by forcing legislatures to pass the kinds of redistributive policies they generally avoided. This chapter provides what may be the strongest evidence for an American positive rights tradition that exists primarily at the state level. Throughout American history and even in the face of federal involvement, state and local governments have been responsible for establishing and maintaining public school systems. Furthermore, every state constitution currently includes a provision about public education, and many state supreme courts have explicitly declared these provisions to be educational rights.
Chapter six, a study of labor rights, addresses an area in which active state intervention has been far more controversial, and in which constitutional rights are typically thought to have restrained the American state, not expanded its responsibilities.
In fact, the quintessential arguments about America's exceptional anti-statism have focused on the labor movement. It demonstrates that the American labor movement pursued the creation of constitutional rights even during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, when courts were at their busiest enforcing constitutional rights to the liberty of contract and nullifying protective labor regulations in their name. At the same time, the proponents of protective governance also created new constitutional rights (at the state level) to legitimize, and indeed to mandate, governmental protection for laborers. Thus, this chapter demonstrates that, even in the area of labor regulation, Americans have successfully pursued the creation of positive constitutional rights. It also establishes that rights are not always designed to judicialize controversies, but are also created to exclude the judiciary from policymaking.
Chapter seven examines the campaigns for constitutional rights to environmental protection. This case is particularly interesting not simply because it challenges the assertion that America lacks positive rights, but also because of its timing. In the 1960s and 1970s, when Congress was passing landmark environmental regulations and an entire executive agency had been developed to address the subject, environmental activists still staged state-level campaigns to add new positive rights to their constitutions. Thus, this case study allows us to investigate the value of state constitutional rights in an era of expanding federal responsibility. It also demonstrates that, like the education and labor rights before them, these environmental-rights provisions were intended to mandate active and protective government at the state level. They were also designed to enable political change and to facilitate the construction of a political movement, not to entrench the status quo.
This study examines both the nature and political origins of America's positive constitutional rights, and its arguments raise a number of questions that I hope future research will pursue. One such question is the extent to which these positive rights worked or mattered. While I describe instances of their successful enforcement and the political value of particular positive rights in particular cases, I do not advance a general argument about the efficacy of either positive rights or state constitutions. In other words, this book focuses on the causes, rather than the consequences, of the provisions it highlights.
Finally, this study is an empirical look at rights movements and their aims; I do not develop an argument about the normative desirability of positive rights or of the politics that surrounds them. My case studies of positive-rights movements do tend to emphasize their redistributive and progressive features. Yet it is just as important to recognize that these rights movements were often committed to the proposition that only members of their own race or religion should benefit from the state's intervention and protection, and they maintained this position to the detriment of some of the most vulnerable residents of their states. The constitutional tradition I document here is, like most of America politics, appealing in some respects and abhorrent in others. Therefore, I
conclude the book with a discussion of the exclusionary and racist side of the movements that championed positive rights. Whatever we ultimately conclude about their normative value, however, these movements for positive rights have clearly shaped America's constitutional law. 
Notes

